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Abstract
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the role of digital spaces in the
dissemination of health information. These online spaces present legitimate
dangers for the future of global health, as they perpetuate COVID-19 conspiracies
and promote the rejection of health authority. This thesis asks how digital social
spaces allow for the spread of COVID-19 misinformation. Through a discourse
analysis of conspiracy narrative news coverage, I study the development of three
COVID-19 conspiratorial narratives: the Wuhan Lab theory, the Plandemic
theory, and the 5G-Coronavirus theory. I aim to understand how these discourses
took advantage of the unique character of digital social spaces to contradict
reputable health authorities. The results of my analysis indicate that COVID
narratives are built on reproduced conspiracy motifs, xenophobia, and medical
populist rhetoric. They use traditional methods in journalistic epistemology and
victimization plots to establish their knowledge claims as credible. Additionally,
the circulation of misinformation in digital space is the result of conspiracy
networks and AI algorithms. The conclusions drawn from this research indicate
that mainstream media and knowledge producers need to change their methods of
disputing conspiracy knowledge claims.

Keywords: COVID-19; misinformation; digital space
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1. Introduction
In March of 2020, Sars-Cov-2 was a burgeoning spectacle. Grocery store
shelves were left barren after panicked attempts at storing supplies. The CDC
dispersed new information each day, sharing sparse factoids that often left the
public more unnerved than informed. Residents of digital spaces turned to
crowdsourced information to try and piece together what was occurring, leading
to a barrage of bad advice and snake oil cures (Stephens, 2020). Popular digital
networks like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube turned into misinformation
hotspots (Bridgman et al., 2020). These hotspots were breeding grounds for
complicated COVID-19 conspiracies, many of which discouraged social
distancing and CDC-approved health behaviors. These conspiracy narratives grew
in popularity in both conservative right-wing circles and left-leaning new age
groups, garnering frustration from mainstream authorities. In the early days of the
pandemic, it was easy for mainstream institutions to dismiss conspiracies as
aimless, fake stories made up by “crazy people”. But a storm was brewing online,
one that threatened to spill over into the real world while the CDC was distracted
by rising death rates.
One year later, the effects of believing in COVID-19 conspiracies have
manifested physically in the United States and around the world. A pharmacist in
a Milwaukee suburb was arrested for ruining 570 vials of Moderna’s COVID-19
vaccine, as he believed they would change a vaccinated individual’s DNA
(Dewan & Nolan, 2021). In the UK and around Europe, cellular towers have been
burned to the ground in fear of 5G radiation (Kelion, 2020). Known conspiracist
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and QAnon believer, Marjorie Taylor Greene, is now an elected representative in
the House; within her first few months in office she has promoted QAnon
misinformation, refused to wear a mask around other representatives, and called
for the deaths of other elected officials (Elliot, 2021). And, as pharmaceutical
companies race to develop and distribute vaccines internationally, the continued
presence of vaccine skepticism threatens the hope of achieving herd immunity
within the next year (Sanchez & Peña, 2021). All the while, the virus continued to
infect and kill. 369,453 American citizens died from COVID-19 in 2020 (CDC,
2021). How did these narratives spread so quickly across the country, and grow to
the point where they had real, tangible effects on society?
This research seeks to understand how conspiracy stories are reproduced
and circulated in digital social spaces, and how they assert epistemic authority
over dominant health narratives. The focus on conspiracies allows me to study the
replication of misinformation in social spaces, as well as analyze the prominence
of medical populism in misinformation narratives. I will examine the discourse of
and surrounding three COVID-19 conspiracy narratives using Foucauldian
discourse analysis. The analysis follows three core research questions: how does
the infrastructure of digital space promote the spread of health misinformation,
what are the recurring components of conspiracy narratives, and why does these
components appeal to anti-health authority social spaces, and how do
conspiracies establish epistemic authority over the dominant disease narratives?
Using the mainstream media’s documentation of conspiracy narratives, I track the
circulation of the narratives across social media and mainstream news platforms. I
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argue that while the infrastructure of social media networks makes it easier for
narratives to circulate, story reproduction in mainstream media spaces increases
the story’s epistemic credit. The narratives utilize emotional appeals, high-quality
production, and other epistemological techniques to convince the public that they
are “true”. I conclude that preventing the spread of online misinformation requires
a shift in engagement with the narratives, as the traditional forms of disproving
misinformation have been adapted into “evidence” within a conspiracy.

Theoretical Frameworks
The subject of this research is complicated, as it applies geographic and
media theory to conspiracy narratives, a concept that is normally treated as
non-academic by mainstream authorities. In order to perform this analysis, I built
my discourse analysis on
a mix of concepts from literature in geography and media studies. This framework
combines concepts in digital geography, Carlson’s components of circulation, and
epistemology, as well as Russian formalist literary theory. In this section, I will
briefly address the origins of this research’s framework, which will be expanded
upon in the literature review. Following this, I will outline the methods and
justification for this project.
I am using James Ash’s three categories of digital space to contextualize
this research in the field of geography. “Digital space” is space constructed by
new media, technology, and the internet (Ash et al., 2016). It exists under the
umbrella of “mediated geography”, or geographies that are aided by or produced
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through forms of media; this includes media and communication geographies
such as literary geography or the geography of cinema (Adams, 2016). In order to
differentiate the “digital” from the larger field of “mediated”, I’m adapting James
Ash’s categories of digital space. These categories of space provide guidelines to
help understand what is and is not “digital geography”. The spaces are defined as
geography through the digital, geography produced by the digital, and geography
of the digital. The concepts set up spatial guidelines for digital infrastructures.
Setting up this conceptual space framework allows me to isolate the “where” my
research is occurring and opens up room to engage with media theory; in this
research, I will be exploring the notion of geography of the digital, or the spaces
constructed in social media.
The primary media studies frameworks that I will be adopting come from
the field of critical journalism studies. These frameworks will help me analyze
how conspiracies become epistemic beliefs for conspiracists. The first concept
comes from Matthew Carlson’s research on epistemology and digital news
circulation (Carlson, 2020). This article addresses how components of online
news circulation establish a piece of information as “fact’. It offers a conceptual
framework for understanding how an idea interacts with digital infrastructures and
becomes information. I am also drawing from the field of epistemology, or the
study of knowledge production and justification (Ekström & Westlund, 2019).
Epistemology is concerned with how neutrality, objectivity, and fact-checking
interact with knowledge production. Specifically, I am drawing from journalistic
epistemology to understand how media spaces traditionally produce knowledge
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narratives (Godler et al., 2020). This framework links concepts of digital
geography with the components of circulation, as it is shaped by digital
infrastructures and studies how specific circulation practices contribute to the
acceptance or rejection of news information (Miller & Record, 2017.)
Finally, my thesis draws on Russian formalist theory—particularly the
writings of Victor Shklovsky and Vladimir Propp—for its discussion and
comprehension of “narrative”. “Narrative”, as it is defined in this research, is a
sequence of events that reveals a “truth of affairs” (Shklovsky, 1966/1990, p. 56).
The words “narrative” and “story” will be used interchangeably. Formalist theory
is interested in the elements of a narrative that contribute to its truth, such as
setting or character (Louchart & Aylett, 2004). It argues that every story exists in
relation to others and follows predictable events and motifs. Utilizing this concept
of “narrative”, I aim to identify the repeated story components that are common
in conspiracies, and analyze how they interact with epistemology to create “true”
conspiracy narratives.

Methods and Broader Impacts
In order to identify the common narrative components across the
conspiracies, this research will focus on a discourse analysis of documents from
American media spaces. While the conspiracies in this research first circulated on
social media platforms, many original texts were removed after the mass
implementation of misinformation policies. News articles, on the other hand,
provide documentation of the narrative’s history, as well as play a role within the
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stories themselves. All documents were published between January and October
of 2020, providing a comprehensive exploration into the proliferation of
conspiracies. Because of this time frame, this research will not address the
vaccine hesitancy movement that occurred later in the pandemic.
The analysis of these documents will be guided by three research
questions. The first asks, how does the infrastructure of digital space promote the
spread of health misinformation? This question draws from Carlson’s circulation
components as well as concepts in digital space. It helps identify the digital spaces
that are vulnerable to misinformation and understand how attempts at blocking
conspiracies redirect the narratives into more inaccessible spaces. The second
question asks, what are the recurring components of conspiracy narratives, and
why do these components appeal to anti-health authority social spaces? This
question is also grounded in Carlson’s circulation components, as well as
narrative theory. This will guide the discussion and provide insight as to why
conspiracies are becoming harder to combat in mainstream spaces. The final
question is, how do conspiracies establish epistemic authority over the dominant
disease narratives? It draws from the field of epistemology to identify the
knowledge claims used to reject mainstream public health information.
Understanding the epistemic claims will help identify potential counter-claims to
incorporate into public health narratives. This combination of questions should
produce an analysis and discussion that focus on the common components of
conspiracy narrative construction.
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The conclusions in this thesis provide important insight for combating the
spread of medical populism, a political discourse that pits “the people” against
public health establishments, and promotes dangerous health practices (Lasco,
2020). Medical populists diminish the risk of a health crisis, encouraging their
followers to continue living a life with caution. Former U.S President Trump and
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro both used this rhetoric to dismiss COVID-19
and delay government safety precautions, while also promoting
hydroxychloroquine as a “miracle cure” (Fox, 2020). They also adopted
conspiracy narratives into their rhetoric, with Trump promoting the idea that
COVID was man-made, and Bolsonaro arguing that the virus was a hoax made by
the media (Lasco, 2020, p. 1420). The overlap in conspiratorial and populist
rhetoric is cause for concern, especially when it’s being adopted by government
authorities with the power to interfere with health protocols. The analysis drawn
from this thesis will contribute to potential methods of combating this discourse in
personal and political spaces.

The rest of the paper will be organized as follows. Following this
introduction is a more informed discussion about COVID-19 and misinformation,
focusing on the virus’s history and some of the political decisions that were
informed by conspiracy narratives. Then, I will situate my research in the larger
academic literature of geography and media studies, expanding upon the ideas
presented in my theoretical framework. After this is the methodology and the
results, where I address my findings as responses to my initial research questions.
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The discussion returns to the idea of “narrative” as it outlines how conspiracies
use digital spaces and epistemology to develop their stories. Finally, my
conclusion will present alternatives for addressing conspiracy discourses in
populist rhetoric.
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2. Background
The COVID-19 Pandemic
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19, commonly referred to as COVID
or coronavirus) is a highly transmissible disease spread through inhalation of the
virus through droplets in the air (Forati & Ghose, 2020). It is a respiratory virus
related to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), which are both coronaviruses. COVID-19 was
first documented in December of 2019, when health officials identified a cluster
of cases in Wuhan, China (Patel & Jernigan, 2020). The virus has a wide array of
symptoms, the most common being a dry cough, a fever, and the loss of the sense
of smell (CDC, 2020). Symptoms can appear anywhere between 2 and 14 days
after exposure; those infected are contagious for up to 10 days after their first sign
of symptoms. Reinfection with COVID-19 is uncommon within the first 90 days
of developing symptoms. COVID-19 is particularly dangerous for those who have
underlying health conditions, those who are immunocompromised, and the
elderly. For periods of time when the COVID-19 vaccine is unavailable, health
officials encouraged social distancing and isolation as the primary way to contain
and combat the virus (Forati & Ghose, 2020). Members of the public were asked
to wear face masks to decrease the chance of spreading COVID-19 particles.
The first case of COVID-19 in the United States was identified in
Washington in late January of 2020 (Forati & Ghose, 2020). It spread rapidly
across the country, striking densely populated cities the hardest. California, New
York, and Florida became virus epicenters, either due to a general lack of PPE and
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medical supplies, or political officials who disregarded the outbreak. Both factors
are the result of the US government’s mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic,
which has drawn international outrage and is credited as one of the main reasons
the United States has the highest COVID-19 mortality rate in the world. Former
President Donald Trump chose to focus on banning travel to infected countries
instead of implementing early, nationwide lockdowns that had proven effective in
other countries (Yong, 2020). The president chose to leave preventative measures
to state officials, an action that resulted in some governors mandating lockdowns
and others hosting massive public events (Alvarez, 2020).

COVID-19 and Misinformation
COVID-19 misinformation is an international issue. During the first few
months of the pandemic, false information about COVID-19 treatment spread
across the internet, resulting in fraudulent miracle cures, injuries, and in rare
cases, death. An Arizona man died after consuming an aquarium cleaning product
containing what he thought was the drug chloroquine, a product that was falsely
declared a cure for coronavirus (Shepherd, 2020). Worldwide, anti-lockdown
protests have taken place in Europe, North America, and parts of the Middle East
(Haddad, 2021). The massive gatherings usually violate a number of COVID-19
safety protocols and lead to an increase in cases weeks later.
The direct link between misinformation and COVID-19 has been studied
and identified by geographers using spatial analysis of geo-tagged tweets and
COVID-19 rates (Forati & Ghose, 2020). Regions where COVID-19
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misinformation was more common also reported higher rates of COVID-19
infections and deaths. In the US, part of this rampant misinformation spreading is
attributed to the beliefs of several Republican politicians, some of whom refused
to implement lockdowns in the face of the pandemic. Health officials have tried to
emphasize the importance of health behaviors that would contain the virus, but
were shut down by former President Trump and members of his administration.
Now, as vaccine distribution stars across the country, health experts must grapple
with the lasting effects of COVID-19 conspiracies on herd immunity and
compliance with positive health behaviors.

16
3. Literature Review
The literature review joins together research in geography, media studies,
and critical public health to develop the relationship between misinformation
circulation, digital spaces, and public health. In order to ground this work in
geography, this review begins with a detailed discussion of digital social spaces.
This leads into three separate but interrelated sections about the epistemology of
news, media fragmentation, and circulation practices. The final sections address
misinformation circulation and narrative construction.
The texts reviewed come from the fields of geography and media studies,
with selections from research in critical public health to inform the section on
pandemic discourses. The review covers research published in the late 1990s
through 2020, as well as select older theoretical pieces that were written by
Michel Foucault and Edward Said (Foucault, 2010, originally published in 1976;
Said, 2010, originally published in 1978). Some of the most notable scholars
covered in this review are Paul Adams, James Ash, Rob Kitchin, Angela
Leszczynski, Shawn Smallman, and Matthew Carlson (See Adams, 2016; Ash et
al., 2016; Smallman, 2018; Carlson, 2020).

Digital Social Spaces
The introduction of the internet has produced a shift in how geographers
understand space and place. Digital technologies changed how geographers
gather, analyze, and display spatial data. The introduction of digital space as a
realm of communication adds a new dimension to how humans encounter and
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exist in social spaces through channels like Twitter and Facebook. These online
social environments are the focus of my thesis research, particularly in terms of
how information spreads through the new forms of participatory geographies.
In order to study the human processes of digital space, the concept of
“space” must be examined and redefined. Space and place as they exist in the
physical world are tangible, to a theoretical extent. “Space” is defined by the
movement of bodies, communication, and information; it can be physical and
conceptual. All spaces operate with the same social processes (Graham, 1998). So
as human production evolves and adapts to the growing realm of media and
digital technology, space—and place—does as well. Space has evolved with
material productions for centuries. Artificial environments now allow for
human-to-human interaction over digital channels of communication (Adams &
Jansson, 2012). This human-to-human is mediated by machine interfaces, which
we interact with on a daily basis through digital technology. These relationships
should lead to the new conceptions of “space” and “place” that exist in between
physical locations and communication infrastructures.
To understand these spaces, I am turning to James Ash’s three types of
digital geographies as a conceptual foundation of digital space. These spaces are
geography through the digital, geography produced by the digital, and the
geography of the digital (Ash et al., 2016). This typology was constructed through
a review of the available digital geography literature and will help legitimize the
role of digital spaces in geographic research.
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Geographies through digital space refer to the production of knowledge
and the presentation of spatial data through digital software (Ash et al., 2016, p.
3). GIS and remote sensing are two tools used by geographers that help create
visual representations of spatial data. Maps are a technology used to legitimize
geographic research. This type of knowledge generation also includes the
technologies used to collect and interpret qualitative data; interviews must be
recorded, stored on a drive, and analyzed through transcription services. All of
these tools contribute to geographic knowledge production.
Geographies produced by the digital are grounded in the relationship
between “space” and the built environment. Digital media augments the
production of physical space and urban development. Cities use digital systems
for planning projects and communicating with constituents (Ash et al., 2016, p.
6). Coding software helps mediate city functions. Cities known as “smart cities”
use digital space to provide services like managing bike-share programs and
tracking buses. Through technology, physical landscapes are changed, mapped,
and reinterpreted online. This also applies to constructions of spaces and places
that are viewed through a digital platform; products like OpenStreetMap allow
users to contribute data and produce collaborative maps of real-world locations
(Ash et al., 2016, p. 8). Users can experience a “place” without physically visiting
it, producing a new understanding of that location based on the images and
information available online.
Geographies of the digital conceptualizes mediated networks as a type of
geographic space (Ash et al., 2016, p. 8). This includes spaces based on
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interpersonal interaction, such as social media platforms, forums, and online
video games. Geographies of the digital are built by shared experiences and
mediated conversations. People don’t have to rely on physical proximity to
connect with others; through mediated spaces, you can see, hear, and engage with
others all over the world. Social media platforms like Instagram and Facebook are
digital spaces; users can select whose content they receive and who is able to see
what the user posts (Suh, 2020). These spaces are particularly important as they
are participatory geographies, or spaces shaped by social engagement and public
information distribution (Malecki, 2016, p. 9). In social media spaces, users can
build their networks based on the people and information they agree with (Elwood
& Leszczynski, 2013). The key aspect of these geographies is that users are able
to share knowledge with others, regardless of whether or not the information is
true. Because of this, these spaces are more vulnerable to the spread of
misinformation than others.
The development of participatory knowledge production in digital spaces
has changed how ideas become socially accepted “information”. The
infrastructure of digital spaces blurs the line between personal social spaces and
academic spaces; platforms like public-facing blogs allow academics to distribute
their findings in easily accessible posts (Kitchin et al., 2013).This combination of
sources has led to a blurring between the notions of “truth” and fiction”; digital
spaces can be crafted to accept information narratives that confirm their personal
beliefs and reject those that don’t fit that picture. The next section will explore
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this relationship as it pertains to news information and epistemic authorities.

Epistemic Authority in News Production
The changes in participatory geography and knowledge production are
tied to questions of epistemology. Epistemology is the study of how we know
what we know. This research is founded in journalistic epistemology, which is
understood as the rules and routines that decide how the news is produced and
expressed as knowledge (Carlson, 2020). In news production, there are certain
practices that construct and verify knowledge. Defining these practices will be
important for analyzing how conspiracy narratives become accepted as
“information” in digital spaces.
Information production in journalism is built on specific practices and the
institutional role of news media. In journalism, the primary method is the
verifiable testimony; this is either accomplished through an interview with an
eye-witness or an expert of the topic (Usher, 2020). Photos, graphs, and other data
visualizations are used to provide a visual for the audience; they can either
provide supporting data about the history of a subject, or provide readers with an
image confirming that an event happened (Ekström & Westlund, 2019). These
methods produce verifiable “evidence” to support the knowledge claim. However,
part of journalistic epistemology is the historical trust of journalists as epistemic
authorities. They are perceived as credible so long as they continue to be
transparent in knowledge communication (Elwood & Leszczynski, 2013).
Traditional news media institutions are built on ethical codes and the commitment
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to unbiased truth (Ekström & Westlund, 2019). Audiences should trust reporters
based on the institutional role the media plays in producing credible information.
While news discourses frame journalists as news authorities, there’s a
growing gap in trust between American journalists and their audiences. With the
digital turn in news production, there has been a shift in how consumers accept
the media as an epistemic authority. Part of this is due to the fragmentation of
mainstream media.

News Media Fragmentation
The digital turn in media production has changed how news media is
developed and circulated. This section is concerned with the evolution and
eventual fragmentation of news media, which includes physical and digital
newspapers, television programs, and alternative blogs and YouTube shows
(Mancini, 2013). This wide variety of platforms has assisted the rapid
politicization of news information, and subsequently, the spread of conflicting
“news” narratives.
Digital spaces have changed the way news media produces and spreads
knowledge. At its inception, the internet was a “disruptive technology”; it made
reporting an instantaneous process and allowed for audiences to receive news
digitally (Ahlers, 2006). Organizations shifted online to reduce the cost of
producing physical copies of their papers, at the risk of reducing the revenue
reporters received. In fear of losing their positions as papers shrunk their staff,
reporters had to develop new skills like copy-editing and photography to stay
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competitive (Kammer, 2013, p. 151). Journalists also had to start interacting with
digital audiences in order to stay relevant. There was a wall between reporters and
their readers, many of whom were now used to the easy access of social media
(Skoler, 2010).
Social media platforms are public and private networks that allow users to
connect with friends, family, and strangers around the world. They provide users
with quick snippets of information from the accounts of journalists or online
papers (Dubois & Blank, 2018). The rapid ability to post on an aggregated tag
makes it easy to access international news and updates about social movements
(Messing & Westwood, 2012). Additionally, users can select what topics they
want to follow and which individuals they want to hear from (Lasora et al., 2012).
Users will only see things that interest them, limiting the news information that
they absorb. This is known as selective exposure theory, or the sometimes
unintentional decision to limit media engagement to specific sources. The
literature on selective exposure theory dates back to news consumption in the
1950s (Iyngar, 2009). It’s a two-way process: consumers return to the same few
media sources for information, while media companies try to cater to specific
demographics. Wealthy voters in politically red neighborhoods might encounter
more advertisements for Republican politicians, regardless of whether or not they
are Republican themselves (Iyngar, 2009, p.3).
Selective exposure theory in American media has coincided with the rapid
fragmentation and later polarization of online news sources. “Fragmentation” is
what occurs when the audience of one or two sources becomes more widely
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distributed across news platforms (Dubois & Blank, 2018, p. 731). It’s not a
harmful process on its own. However, selecting specific outlets and ignoring
others—such as the case in selective exposure theory—can feed into news
polarization. Polarization occurs when communities divide on an issue (Dubois &
Blank, 2018). When audiences are pushed further left or right by polarization, it
can lead to individuals choosing “alternative” news outlets over mainstream
sources. These networks, operating outside of the need to verify information like
traditional journalists, have been known to publish and promote false information
and stories that later end up being false (Bergmann, 2020).
Misinformation circulation can produce dangerous results, many of which
alternative outlets will not take credit for. In order to understand how this kind of
information spreads throughout anti-media authority networks, we must first
understand the process of digital information circulation.
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Processes of News Circulation
News circulation is the process of spreading messages and ideas through
people and institutions (Bødker, 2015). It includes the production, distribution,
and reproduction of information across platforms. Processes of news circulation,
which used to be based on physical media and word of mouth, now rely on the
non-linear, globalized nature of the internet. To better understand the distribution
of information online, we will turn to Carlson’s three components of digital news
circulation: infrastructure, circulation practices, and epistemic contests. These
components the flow of information as well as how readers assess epistemic
claims for legitimacy.
The infrastructure of digital spaces does not adhere to the same temporal
and spatial limitations as the physical world. Digital news can spread across
platforms and countries through human and non-human actors (Carlson, 2020, p.
236). Putting a piece of information on Facebook makes it shareable to your entire
friends list in an instant. Users in Russia can access information about events
going on in Brazil, just as quickly as Brazilians could do the same for Russia.
Non-human actors are just as important in the infrastructure, if not more so;
YouTube creators rely on the platform’s algorithm to promote their videos, and
many have experienced content suppression if they don’t meet the algorithm’s
standards for “good content”. Twitter algorithms are designed to promote popular
stories, often in short, digestible pieces. These structures can help push popular
stories and suppress important information.
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In digital space, human actors can select what sources they engage with,
while algorithms can push specific stories that fit the user’s narrative. The choices
of these individual actors are known as circulation practices. Carlson highlights
two key aspects of online consumer practices: curation systems and mobile media
(p. 238). Curation limits the sources encountered online to whatever the reader
has selected; this can be by only following individuals in specific interest groups,
following or censoring hashtags, or viewing content selected for them by the
algorithm. Mobile media is another term for social media, which has been covered
in prior sections of this review.
The final component of circulation is the role of epistemic contests in
news selection. Epistemic contests are made when individuals publicly question
the claims made in a piece of news (Carlson, 2020, p. 240). With the increasing
political polarization of news sources, epistemic claims must compete with each
other to assert legitimacy. The competition leads audiences to question sources
and identify figures they trust to distribute accurate knowledge. Digital spaces
complicate epistemic contests by creating direct channels of information that can
go unchallenged. Former U.S President Donald Trump’s Twitter feed went
unchecked for years, often challenging claims made by mainstream “liberal”
media. He and other “alternative news sources” are elevated to the same level of
news-making as trained journalists (Godler et al., 2020). These sources make
claims using tactics similar to the mainstream authorities, but do not actually
provide factual information. The following section will explore how these claims
are part of a larger problem in knowledge production: the spread and acceptance
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of misinformation narratives.

Misinformation and Conspiratorial Narratives
The growing distrust in journalism and the fragmentation of mainstream
media have led to two trends in modern news consumption. Media fragmentation
and the turn towards digital knowledge production has led to the proliferation and
acceptance of misinformation in digital spaces. The acceptance of conspiracies as
truths can get in the way of actual news dispersion and, if there is nothing done to
intervene with some drastic narratives, these claims can present a real danger to
actual people.
Misinformation and disinformation can be found in media narratives
throughout history. They’re three distinct concepts that all play a role in the
proliferation of false information in news media. Misinformation is false
information that is spread unintentionally, while disinformation is incorrect
information that’s intentionally spread by malicious actors as a method of
disrupting the flow of “truth” (Van Heekeren, 2019). Both contribute to the
construction of a conspiracy, a fake information narrative that attributes a political
or social event to an elite group of actors who are trying to maintain power or
cause harm (Mancosu & Vegetti 2020).
Though they’re characterized by news discourses as unbelievable and
ridiculous, conspiracies are often built on dangerous ideas that promote disbelief
in mainstream authorities. Countries with a highly polarized political divide and
stark socioeconomic inequalities—like the United States—are susceptible to
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populist attempts at social division (Thomson et al., 2020). One example of this
populist conspiracy overlap is the Pizzagate narrative from 2016, a story that
came out of the far-right misinformation group QAnon. Pizzagate argued that
prominent liberal politicians were running a pedophilic sex trafficking ring out of
a pizza place in Washington D.C. (Bergmann, 2020). It was first circulated online
in March by the alternative news outlet InfoWars. The Pizzagate narrative almost
caused physical harm when a North Carolina resident stormed the pizza restaurant
with an assault rifle (Bergmann, 2020, p. 251). While this is not the only example
of a conspiracy affecting the real-world, it is important as it represents the danger
of internalizing populist conspiracies as “truths”. This thesis hopes to provide a
more in-depth assessment as to why populist and anti-health authority
conspiracies continue to circulate as a part of pandemic discourses.

Pandemic Narratives in the Media
In order to understand COVID-19 misinformation narratives, I want to
first discuss the history of prominent pandemic discourses and motifs. Pandemic
narratives in the media are built on specific perceptions of health that might
diminish the severity of one disease while exaggerating another. These narratives
come from both traditional news and entertainment media, and can influence the
audience’s risk perceptions of disease (Kendal, 2019). Some of these narratives
promote international discord, while others contribute to the growing distrust of
health authorities. The following section will review some of the most common
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pandemic narratives, before synthesizing this literature section with a discussion
about health conspiracies.
One of the most pandemic motifs is the presence of xenophobic subtext in
media coverage. There are two techniques used in xenophobic narratives: active
blaming and passive othering, the latter of which is a theory originating in Edward
Said’s essay Orientalism. Both use xenophobia to characterize a foreign country
as responsible for a pandemic. Active blaming depicts a country as a specific
target, while othering presents an “us vs. them” narrative and makes negative
knowledge claims about the “them” (Said, 1978/2010). An example of othering
was the early coverage of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, which labeled it “the Mexican
flu” and presented the virus as an issue endemic to Mexico (Smallman, 2015).
Because US media outlets depicted Mexico as violent and dirty, their audience
were led to believe that the country was a natural birthplace for the virus. An
example of active blaming is the coverage of tuberculosis in New Zealand, where
reporters regularly isolate immigrants—particularly refugees—as the sole
spreaders of the infection (Lawrence, 2008). Both narratives pinned an epidemic
on a marginalized group as a method of shifting blame away from the dominant
government and health authorities, whether or not they’ve actually failed to act.
Another common motif in pandemic narratives is the usage of war rhetoric
to describe an epidemic. Viruses are framed as military opponents that only the
regimes of science can defeat (Lawrence, 2008). An analysis of Belgian television
coverage highlighted the use of military vocabulary to frame SARS as an
aggressive conqueror (Joye, 2010). SARS was a foreign invader attacking
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national soil. This language asserted SARS as a foreign threat—one linked to an
exotic country—and framed the brave Belgian scientists combatting it as heroes.
This kind of representation is an attempt to build trust between the public and the
health authorities. Other forms of war rhetoric focus on the impacts of the disease
on the general population. During the H1N1 pandemic, tensions in Egypt boiled
to the surface between religious groups as Coptic Christians continued to bring
pigs into the country (Smallman, 2015). One religious leader claimed H1N1 was
“more dangerous than the hydrogen bomb…It is a punishment from God”
(Smallman, 2015, p. 8). His statement drew on fears of international attacks as
well as religious panic. Being worse than the H-bomb makes H1N1 appear like a
tool of bioterrorism; this language preys on fears of bioterrorist attacks, disrupting
scientific attempts at isolating a natural origin and stirring up panic in the public.
In some cases, such as the case with COVID-19, fears of bioterrorism spiral into
full-blown conspiracies.
An overarching theme in news media coverage, film discourse, and health
information is the role of conspiratorial narratives impeding the spread of medical
facts. Many pandemic movies include a conspiracy plot attributed to the
government, the pharmaceutical industry, or the Centers for Disease Control
(Kendal, 2019, p. 6). These narratives are representative of a larger outbreak of
conspiratorial misinformation, as every new epidemic is plagued by health
conspiracies. They often stem from a lack of information during the early days of
the pandemic (Smallman, 2018). These narratives are still dangerous, though, as
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they promote the rejection of public health recommendations, which in turn can
prolong the effects of the pandemic.

A Word on Narrative
To understand how misinformation narratives are produced and accepted
by conspiracists, first, we must address the construction of narratives. They are
made up of events and motifs (or repeated ideas) that produce a meaning or truth
(Shklovsky, 1966/1990). Every story has a distinct set of events with a
cause-and-effect relationship. The context and form of a narrative are understood
based on its relationship with other stories, as they all are reproductions of the
same motifs in different contexts (New World Encyclopedia, 2021). To
understand the meaning of a narrative, an analyst must look at the individual
components that contribute to the story’s sequence of events (Louchart & Aylett,
2004). These are “motifs”, or repeated ideas and symbols that hold specific
meaning. This includes the characters, their actions, and the setting. In his writing
on Russian folktales, formalist Vladimir Propp designed a system of “symbolic
identifiers” that classified the components of a story and explained why they
occurred in a specific sequence. Within specific genres, every narrative will share
the same structures and truths. This is important to note, as when we move into
the results and discussion, we will return to the reproduced truths of conspiracy
narratives, as well as examine the cause-and-effect relationships within the
stories.
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Synthesis
Using these established concepts in media studies and geography, I am
situating the distribution of conspiracy narratives within the realm of digital
geographic space, as a byproduct of the mediated fragmentation of American
news media. The process of misinformation distribution starts when alternative
news sources—online platforms that were founded in opposition to mainstream
media—publish misinformation about a health crisis. Readers who’ve elected to
believe that platform as an epistemic authority circulate that information in their
personal social networks, including special interest Facebook groups and on
Twitter. The infrastructure of these social spaces allows misinformation to be
spread rapidly without immediate intervention from the site’s administrators. This
process is particularly harmful when it comes to health misinformation, as the
acceptance of these conspiratorial ideas can lead to the increased risky health
behaviors, conflict with health authorities, and in some cases, the destruction of
public property.
While this literature covers the process of misinformation distribution, it
does not address the role that digital spaces and the mainstream media play within
a conspiracy narrative. How do conspiracies take advantage of digital space to
avoid third-party actors? What about digital media spaces, such as mainstream
news? This thesis will evaluate the roles of social media and mainstream media
within the context of the narratives, as well as their impact on circulation. Though
the literature might understand the distribution, it does not explore the narrative
appeals that inform circulation practices. The research might indicate a link
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between belief in conspiracies as truth and negative health behaviors, but it does
not discuss how the narratives use epistemic techniques to assert themselves as
“knowledge”. Smallman’s coverage of Zika conspiracy narratives addresses their
spread over social media, but does not indicate what core concepts established
them as “truths” for some individuals. In that regard, this thesis will assess how
the origins and appeals of narratives can help establish epistemic claims, as well
as provide valuable insights on how digital social spaces promote the sharing of
harmful information.
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4. Methodology
Critical Discourse Analysis
I utilized the critical discourse analysis methodology to understand how
specific narratives are constructed, reproduced, and circulated within certain
contexts. Originating with the French philosopher Michel Foucault, the critical
discourse analysis method is designed to be an open process of analyzing “media”
to offer insight towards how an idea becomes a dominant piece of knowledge
(Waitt, 2010). Through an epistemic lens, this analysis seeks to understand how
some ideas are produced and converted into socially accepted “knowledge” by
way of rhetoric and imagery. Critical discourse analysis also examines how
certain media structures legitimize some narratives and reject others (Millear,
2015). Critical discourse analysis differs from methods such as content analysis,
which focuses on the co-occurrence of words and categorizes phrases in simpler
terms. Instead of highlighting the relationship between specific words, a critical
discourse analysis addresses the larger reproduction of ideologies across texts.
This is a primary reason I have selected a CDA: I aim to track the circulation of
ideologies across media—mainly social media and news articles—as well as how
they’ve been reproduced in different texts.
The critical discourse analysis can be met with scrutiny, as it does not have
a concrete set of rules. In Foucault’s initial writing, he neglected to outline clear
guidelines about what was a valid form of discourse analysis, out of the fear that
his work would be too formulaic (Waitt, 2010). Much like how Foucault’s writing
was criticized for being too vague, on its own, the discourse analysis method
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lacks structure and guidelines for analysis. To mitigate this, human geographers
have proposed their own frameworks for discourse analysis (Johnson & McClean,
2020). Each discourse analysis should start with a careful selection of the type of
texts, as well as a familiarization with the texts—or “absorbing oneself” into the
themes (Berg, 2009). Geographer Gordon Waitt (2010) outlines additional steps
for the process of analysis, starting with a coding period to identify recurring
themes and ideas. During the coding, researchers should identify “regimes of
truth” present in the narratives, inconsistencies in the discourse, and the “silences”
present—or in other words, identify who is and isn’t speaking (Berg, 2009). I will
use these steps for my discourse analysis and expand upon my coding steps later
in the methodology.
Media coverage of COVID-19 conspiracies presents a complex array of
rhetoric and ideologies that represent a variety of power dynamics, physical and
digital geographies, and epistemic infrastructures that determine what is presented
as truth and how it is circulated. In his 2018 paper discussing the origins of Zika
conspiracies in Brazil, Shawn Smallman uses a discourse analysis of news media,
opinions articles, YouTube videos, and other materials from social media spaces
to identify where a piece of misinformation originated and how the different
forms of media aided in conspiracy circulation. Smallman’s analysis of Zika
conspiracies recognized that “People’s opinion, attitudes, and beliefs are shaped
by material that they receive through WhatsApp, Reddit, YouTube, and social
media” (Smallman, 2018, p. 2). This comprehensive research covers more than
just the social media where conspiracies circulated, resulting in a nuanced
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discussion on the media’s role in spreading conspiracies. Working within the
realm of generalized news media coverage also allows for an analysis of how
media outlets affect health risk perception. Stijn Joye’s research on the discussion
of SARS in Belgian news media utilizes a critical discourse analysis to assess the
representations of “distant” suffering and health risk assessment (Joye, 2010).
This analysis exposed the absence of sympathy for other cultures and the
exaggerated risk perception for the local culture. Though Joye did not study
conspiracies, his research highlighted how forms of news reproduced
misinformation that resulted in an altered state of risk perception. As the primary
effect of believing in a conspiracy is a change in risk perception, we must
understand how those conspiracies are circulated and legitimized in media circles
so that they can be prevented. Therefore, the critical discourse analysis is an
appropriate approach for this research question and pandemic.

Sampling Framework and Selection
Throughout 2020, conspiracy misinformation was spread in digital circles
by way of sharing articles and videos on social media. In the United States, most
of this narrative circulation occurred online through Facebook and Twitter.
However, the implementation of misinformation policies on Facebook, Twitter,
and YouTube has reduced the number of conspiracy posts currently available
online. This discourse analysis instead focuses on news media coverage, which
can document the rhetoric without being removed from the internet. It focuses on
articles from the mainstream media, defined here as news institutions that produce
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content in two or more spaces. In some cases, this refers to online publishing as
well as radio programming, while in others it refers to media production across
different digital spaces (such as producing written content as well as YouTube
videos). Mainstream news media itself plays a role in the development of
narratives, as it can either validate the conspiracy or reject the narrative, which
indirectly legitimizes the misinformation’s ideology. This, combined with the ease
of searching and filtering news articles, is what led me to focus my data selection
on mainstream media.
This methodology draws from several similar critical discourse analyses
that focus on the reproduction of health information and ideologies. Regarding the
discourse analysis’s structure, I adopted steps outlined in Lawrence D. Berg’s
2009 article on discourse analyses, discussed above in the CDA section. Similar
steps were utilized in Eric Carter’s examination of the Blue Zone Project’s online
promotional campaign (Carter, 2015). The decision to analyze news media comes
from Shawn Smallman’s research about Zika and H1N1 conspiracies, which used
a mix of traditional and alternative media to track and explain how
misinformation beliefs become accepted as knowledge (Smallman, 2018;
Smallman, 2015). Stijn Joye’s discourse analysis on SARS coverage was also an
influence, as it follows deconstruction of risk perception in mainstream news
media.
To provide a range of data that reflects the dominant mainstream
authorities in US news circles, documents for this study were collected from
eleven news sources. The variety in selection includes both “objective” reporting
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and “subjective” reporting, reflecting the shift towards opinion articles and
think-pieces as part of the digital turn of journalism. The documents include a
range of political beliefs, including left and right-leaning media, as well as
politically neutral outlets. The array of sources compensated for the deleted social
media content, providing a detailed history of the narratives and their
reproduction. The data comes from news-focused media, “digitally turned” media
(or the outlets that have shifted to opinion-driven content), and post-digital media.
The documents themselves are a combination of news articles and video
transcripts, and include screenshots of deleted Facebook posts and Tweets. They
were published between January and October of 2020; the narratives first
circulated in January, and were finishing circulation by October.
I selected three conspiracy narratives that circulated throughout the
COVID-19 pandemic. Each narrative was selected for the real-world
consequences attributed to them. The three narratives are the Wuhan Lab
narrative, the 5G-COVID narrative, and the Plandemic narrative. The Wuhan Lab
narrative was first popularized in mainstream US social circles by Senator Tom
Cotton and picked up attention from conservative politicians and news outlets.
The promotion of and belief in this narrative has led to an increase in anti-Asian
hate crimes, as the Wuhan narrative paints Asians and Asian-Americans as those
responsible for the pandemic (Kaur, 2021). The 5G-COVID narrative builds onto
years of anti-technology anxieties, arguing that the installation of 5G cellular
towers was the inception of the pandemic. Conspiracists who believe that 5G
causes COVID-19 have started to destroy cell towers in the United Kingdom and
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across Europe, leading the US Department of Homeland Security to start
preparing for physical attacks here as well (Kellion, 2020). The final narrative is
the Plandemic narrative, named after the viral Plandemic docu-series that aired in
the summer of 2020. This narrative combines several common pandemic
conspiracies and blames Bill Gates, Dr. Anthony Fauci, and other international
health authorities for COVID-19’s creation. Believers in the Plandemic narrative
have an increased chance of rejecting social distancing and quarantine norms, and
some of them have cited the scientist at the heart of Plandemic as why they refuse
to wear a mask. Most drastically, the Plandemic narrative pushes the idea that
vaccines are dangerous, prompting a new wave of anti-vaccination sentiments
across the country.
Borrowing from Shawn Smallman’s Zika research, I employed a selective
sampling method to identify and filter through sample documents. First, a general
search was performed for news relating to certain keywords. Each narrative had
two keywords or phrases that I used during this search period. Once a source was
identified as having two or more documents surrounding the narratives, I used the
news source’s search engine to identify older documents using those same
keywords. The keywords for the Wuhan lab narrative were “Wuhan” and “China
coronavirus”. The phrases for the 5G narrative were “5G causes COVID” and
“5G coronavirus”. Finally, the phrases for the Plandemic narrative were
“Plandemic” and “Judy Mikovits”. Documents in the sample were produced
between January and September. This time frame was determined as mainstream
recognition of COVID conspiracies began in January and slowed down in
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September. Conspiracies were recognized after this, but the focus of many of
these documents was QAnon, which was not a primary focus of this research. A
total of 57 documents were collected, with 19 documents per narrative.

Coding
The coding strategy employed in this research was taken from Berg (2009)
and Carter (2015) and is meant to alleviate the subjectivity issue inherent in CDA
methods. The process started an initial coding phase based on four coding groups,
a secondary coding for smaller sub-themes, the identification of common “truths”
and inconsistencies within the narratives, and an examination of the
producer/consumer/subject relationship.
All samples were coded using Atlas.ti. Before coding, I identified four
broad code groups based on the main themes presented in this paper’s literature
review. For the first coding period, I used these groups to sort quotations and
noted sub-themes that would be useful for my final analysis. These codes were
applied during the second period, highlighting the main rhetorical trends and
narrative patterns. This period was also dedicated to identifying who was absent
from the sampling. Quotes were highlighted with larger codes were assigned
sub-theme codes as appropriate.
The four coding groups I developed were Digital Space, Epistemic
Authority, Conspiratorial Narratives, and Pandemic Narrative Trends. There was
also a miscellaneous code, used for noting interesting phrases that didn’t fit into
the four code groups but were still worth discussion. The Digital Space code
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group contains codes related to mediated geographies and social spaces that are
built through digital environments; example codes include “social media” and
“anti-authority networks”. The Conspiratorial Narratives group encompassed
codes that focused on conspiracy rhetoric, generalized misinformation, and
specific conspiracies. This section included codes such as “cover-up”, “removal
of information”, and “QAnon”. This group had some overlap with the Epistemic
Authority group, which focused on methods of asserting “truth” in the media.
This section included the codes “MSM”—shorthand for Mainstream Media—and
“political recognition”. The final group was Pandemic Narrative Trends, shifting
the focus to how conspiracies and mainstream media sources built upon past
outbreak narratives. This includes “anti-vaccination” and “xenophobia”, two
themes that have been identified in the literature surrounding older pandemics.

Table 1. Example of Code Groups, Codes, and Quotations
Code Family

Code

Quote

Digital Space

Anti-Authority

“Featuring Judy Mikovits, who was fired from her job

networks

and whose findings about chronic fatigue syndrome were
retracted, it falsely says that masks can make wearers
sick, that sand can cure the coronavirus, and that autism
can be tied to vaccines.” (BFN, 6). (Other codes:
anti-vaccination movement, victimization, “virologist”.)

Epistemic Authority

Epistemic

"Specifically, Dr Yan never conducted any research on

contests

human-to-human transmission of the novel coronavirus at
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[the University of Hong Kong] during December 2019
and January 2020, her central assertion of the said
interview." (FXN, 4) (Other codes: “Virologist”,
misinformation)

Conspiratorial

Conspiracy at

“Other prominent theories include the claim that the virus

Narratives

large

was accidentally released by the Wuhan Institute of
Virology, or that it was deliberately made as a biowarfare
weapon, either by the Chinese or the Americans. One
increasingly popular idea is that the pandemic is part of a
plan by global elites like Bill Gates or George Soros – in
league with Big Pharma – to institute mandatory
worldwide vaccinations that would include tracking
chips, which would then be activated by 5G radio waves.”
(CON, 1). (Other codes: conspiracy overlap, pandemic
discourse, Wuhan).

Pandemic Narrative
Trends

Pandemic origins

“Third, Martin alleged that the National Institutes of
Health believed there were legal and moral issues with its
research on coronaviruses, which motivated scientists to
transfer the research to China. He based that assertion on
a protocol change that placed a moratorium on funding
for gain-of-function research on a number of viruses in
the United States, including coronaviruses.” (UST, 3).
(Other codes: conflict with authority, misinformation,
overlap, pandemic discourse)
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5. Results and Analysis
The results of this thesis explore the relationship between the digital
spaces, media, and motifs (or themes) of conspiracies. The analysis indicates that
the narratives have the unique ability to adapt events and interactions with other
infrastructures. These infrastructures are spaces built by both technological
processes and interpersonal interactions—in this case, I am referring to social
media and mainstream media. The results also explore the components that make
up the narratives, which either contribute to the emotional appeal of a story (the
pathos) or the epistemological claims (the logos).
These findings were constructed after coding my sample data. I used
Waitt’s CDA guidelines to assess the ‘regimes of truth’ present in the documents,
or the epistemic ideas and core events of the narratives. In this research, the
regimes of truth will also be referred to as narrative motifs. I also analyzed the
inconsistencies presented in the core narratives and the way the media discourses
address the stories. The final results are organized into three thematic groups. The
first covers the relationship between digital media infrastructures and
conspiracies. Includes an exploration into different infrastructures and how they
interact with the narratives. Social media and news media are both discussed in
this section. The second thematic group addresses the common events that occur
in the three conspiracy narratives. This includes narrative themes, such as the
common “cover-up” narrative, as well as the event inconsistencies within the
narratives. The final thematic section covers issues of epistemology and authority
inside the narratives and outside in media discourses. This addresses the
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epistemological conflict between conspiracy narratives and health authorities, in
addition to how conspiracy narratives act as knowledge authorities.

The circulation of narratives through digital infrastructures
COVID-19 conspiracy narratives circulate through social media networks,
YouTube videos, and mainstream media reports. The infrastructures aid narratives
in circulation, as well as play distinct roles within the stories. Social media
infrastructures promote direct sharing between actors or in private groups and
present misinformation as “alternate explanations” for the consequences of the
COVID pandemic. Mainstream media can either present misinformation as a
potential truth or reject the narrative, while indirectly redistributing the story into
new spaces. Even attempts at removing the stories play a role in the narrative’s
development, as it can lead to the construction of new conspiracy spaces.
According to the analysis, the conspiracy narratives were common in
infrastructures that relied on a mix of social interactions and technology. These
spaces—most commonly known as social media—are built with code and have
unique “sharing” features embedded in the site’s data. The code allows for
interpersonal interactions between users, who can select what they share, where
they share it from, and who it’s shared with. They operate as the “setting” of a
narrative. Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube are the most common spaces for
conspiracy circulation, based on specific infrastructural elements. On Facebook,
these narratives are found in private Facebook groups that have the power to
select who is and isn’t allowed inside. Many of these groups were dedicated to

44
far-right politicians, “alternative health” practitioners, and members of QAnon.
The narratives were dispersed into these groups via the ‘sharing’ feature (NYT, 3;
NYT, 4). This feature allows for sharing from group to group, leading to a
cross-circulation between different social spaces. The Plandemic documentary,
for example, was first shared in a private QAnon Facebook group, and from there
it appeared on a page for a prominent member in the anti-vaccination movement
and a page for the Alabama chapter of the Reopen America group (NYT, 4). The
sharing feature is similar on Twitter, which allows users to “retweet” an idea they
agree with or want to comment on. Unlike private Facebook groups, Twitter
infrastructure allows users to create as many accounts as they want and share
information with anyone on the platform. One new Twitter user named
@5gcoronavirus19 was able to send out over 300 tweets in a matter of a week; all
of these tweets promoted the 5G-COVID narrative and many of them tagged
prominent Republican politicians, some of whom hadn’t mentioned the
conspiracy at all (CON, 1). The lack of a fact-checking algorithm allowed
celebrities to share misinformation to millions of people without checking their
sources, like the tweets from performer M.I.A that encouraged her followers to
question if the virus was real or if the symptoms were actually the consequences
of 5G radiation (VOX, 3).
Much like Twitter, YouTube lacked a fact-checking algorithm or an
anti-misinformation policy. The video-sharing network allows users to chop up
and post clips of information from larger videos across the internet. The algorithm
had a limited understanding of “misinformation” and promoted videos of a Fox
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News interview with Senator Tom Cotton, a vocal contributor to the Wuhan
narrative (YTB, 2). YouTube was also rife with conspiracy videos claiming that
5G was a health hazard. Some of the most popular videos were created last year
after cellular companies first rolled out 5G in select cities (BFN, 1). These videos
were pushed by QAnon YouTubers and eventually turned into a weak connection
between 5G and COVID-19 (UST, 4; BFN, 3).
In addition to social media infrastructures, conspiracy narratives also
surfaced in mainstream media “spaces” online. These spaces were constituted as
news websites, affiliated social media accounts, and media-produced videos. The
COVID-19 narratives circulated in these spaces as “news”, and while in most
cases they were being presented as fictitious misinformation stories, some outlets
treated the stories as credible knowledge. The Wuhan Lab narrative was treated as
the most credible story, as some of the actors who contributed to its development
were journalistic or political authorities. It was mostly reproduced through factual
news articles, save for a few opinion pieces. The first major news article about the
Wuhan narrative was published by the Daily Mail on January 23rd (TWP, 7). The
narrative picked up speed when Josh Rogin, a political columnist at The
Washington Post, published two-year-old cables from US science diplomats; these
cables fueled the conspiracy by indicating that there were “safety concerns” about
the Wuhan Institute (BFN, 3). Citing both this article and the statements made by
Tom Cotton, Fox News published several reports on COVID-19’s origins (FXN,
1). Other articles introduced witnesses to the narrative, referencing the claims of a
former MI6 agent and an interview with the alleged Wuhan whistleblower (FXN,
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9; FXN, 4). Fox News’s wealth of Wuhan coverage stood out in the data as one of
the only instances of a mainstream news source that gave a conspiracy narrative
epistemic credit, while also condemning other conspiracies at the same time.
Fox News was not the only news outlet to promote a conspiracy narrative.
The 5G-COVID narrative was introduced into mainstream spaces in January, first
breaking into news media on the 22nd in a Belgian newspaper (FXN, 8). Coverage
increased in late March and early April when Infowars host Alex Jones connected
the 5G narrative to another popular QAnon conspiracy that claimed the world
would experience a universal power outage on April 1st (BFN, 1). In June, a
high-quality video from the digital news network Vice included interviews with
academic figures as well as proponents of the 5G narrative; though the intention
of the video was to push back against the conspiracy, the video indirectly gave a
platform to 5G conspiracists (YTB, 1). The Plandemic narrative received the least
“media credibility”, though its main character, Dr. Mikovits, was at the center of a
broadcasting controversy in July. The American media distributor Sinclair
Broadcast Group came under fire for an interview with Mikovits (VOX, 1).
Sinclair has an expansive network of local-access news stations and provides rural
areas with reliable news information. despite the network’s alleged attempt at
providing multiple perspectives during the interview. The interview was filmed
but pulled from release due to criticism from mainstream media authorities. This
is representative of a larger obstacle for conspiracy circulation: misinformation
policy and censorship.
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The introduction of misinformation policies in digital social spaces
occurred in later April of 2020, at the peak of the 5G and Wuhan narratives.
Twitter installed an algorithm meant to detect and alert users to COVID-19
misinformation (CNN, 5). After the release of Plandemic, Facebook began
“fact-checking” posts to avoid the spread of misinformation (BFN, 6). YouTube’s
crackdown included removing videos that violated its misinformation policy,
warning users about potential misinformation, and reducing the number of
misinformation videos in the “Recommended Video'' section (CON, 2; TWP, 2).
The Plandemic narrative saw the quickest infrastructural reaction, as it was
removed from Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube only three days after its release
(NYT, 4). These policies have received criticism for their “silencing of alternative
opinions'' (FXN, 5). As Fox News host Tucker Carlson remarked in one
document, those being censored were targeted because they “reached
different conclusions than the people currently in charge” (FXN, 7). These claims
coincided with claims made by Plandemic subject Judy Mikovits, who believed
her “silencing” was because she’d asked too many questions (YTB, 3).
With the introduction of misinformation policies, narratives were forced to
relocate. The conspiracy networks moved communication to less regulated
communication apps like WhatsApp and Telegram. Clips from Plandemic began
to circulate on the video-sharing app TikTok (BFN, 7). Even the crowdfunding
website GoFundMe was turned into a platform for the conspiracies, after a
QAnon supporter created a campaign designed to promote Judy Mikovits’s
misinformation narratives (NYT, 1). The fundraiser was later removed for
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violating GoFundMe’s terms of service. In terms of new social spaces, a group
known as Stop 5G UK built its own social network for believers in the
5G-COVID narrative (BFN, 2). Plandemic II: Indoctrination received its
worldwide release on a third-party platform, while the original film was moved
onto other third-party websites to avoid mass-removal (BFN, 6). Censorship and
misinformation policies proved to only be effective at pushing the narratives into
more secure settings.

Regimes of truth in conspiracy narratives
As narratives, COVID-19 conspiracies have several key regimes of truth
that help classify them as misinformation stories. These motifs include the distrust
of certain authority figures and science, the fear of the unknown, and an alleged
“deep state” that wants to take over the world. The “truth” of these narratives is
focused on identifying the culprit. This leads to several narrative inconsistencies
and indicates that identifying a scapegoat or rejecting the dominant health
behaviors is more important to conspiracy audiences than the “truth”.
COVID-19 narratives encourage their audiences to reject dominant health
authorities, who are depicted as corrupt and manipulative. “Health authority”
includes experts from the CDC, NIH, and the WHO, as well as anyone associated
with vaccination programs and the pharmaceutical industry. According to COVID
conspiracy narratives, health experts are overreacting in an attempt to scare
civilians into complying with the government (FXN, 7). The virus is either a
weapon created in order to sell vaccines or is a hoax meant to cover up the crimes

49
of big tech companies and 5G (CON, 3; FXN, 7). The specifics vary depending
on the narrative. In the Wuhan narrative, experts at the CDC and the WHO are
liars who want to cover up the virus’s true origins. Because they have not verified
the narrative—that is, because the WHO has not explicitly stated that COVID-19
came from a Wuhan lab—the narrative argues that the WHO is sacrificing the
world for “political correctness” (FXN, 1). The Plandemic narrative depicts Bill
Gates and Dr. Anthony Fauci as villains responsible for the virus. Plandemic II:
Indoctrination takes specific aim at Gates using a 2013 study that found the Gates
Foundation had a “weak regulatory environment around pharmaceuticals'' (UST,
2). The Gates Foundation is also invested in companies that “cause the social ills''
they claim to be fighting. Gates himself will profit off of the sale of COVID-19
vaccines, whether or not they actually work. Plandemic II also argues that
because the CDC “patented” Sars-CoV, it must be man-made, as it is illegal to put
a patent on a naturally occurring phenomenon (UST, 3). Plandemic points to a
fund transfer from the NIH to the EcoHealth Alliance and then to the Wuhan
Institute of Virology, claiming it’s evidence that the NIH funded the production of
COVID-19 (UST, 3). The narrative reproduces rhetoric from its “main character”
Dr. Mikovits, whose distrust of health authorities stems from the perceived lack of
accountability of pharmaceutical companies:

“You can’t sue the doctor, you can’t sue the manufacturer. There’s a
federal court that oversees vaccine injury and it’s more corrupt than
anything you could ever imagine. And so they do everything they can to
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keep the public from knowing that every single shot damages you.” (YTB,
3)

Dominant health authorities are too powerful and exert their power to continue
controlling the population with harmful vaccines. Any information that supports
their arguments is fake, and therefore anyone who supports the health authority is
in on the lie (CON, 2).
The 5G narrative blends the distrust of health authorities with age-old
fears about new technology to create a conspiracy that vilifies established doctors
and scientific research on cell phones (UST, 4; TIM, 2). Every new wave of
telecommunication technology has garnered the attention of conspiracists.
COVID-19 is a convenient scapegoat for the 5G narrative, providing supporters
with real “symptoms” of 5G (UST, 1; YTB, 1). COVID-19 is most likely just
radiation-induced pneumonia, caused by the increase in 5G towers. Experts who
say otherwise are on the payrolls of the telecommunications industry and are
complicit in radiation poisoning. By positioning health and science authorities as
the big, powerful enemy, COVID-19 conspiracy narratives turn the masses against
the people who are trying to help them.
COVID-19 conspiracies also exploit fears of the unknown and the need
for an explanation in the face of a new threat. All three pandemic narratives
featured in this analysis are explicit about identifying the “true” causes of
COVID-19. In some cases, such as the 5G narrative, the conspiracy is about a
worldwide cover-up. The first few cases of COVID-19 in Wuhan happened to
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overlap with the installation of 5G cell towers in the same area; yes, people were
dying, but that was because the government was testing out the strengths of 5G
(VOX, 3; YTB, 1). According to 5G conspiracists, the lack of proof indicating
that 5G doesn’t emit radiation is a sign of the cover-up (CON, 1). The great 5G
cover-up scheme also means that the death tolls might be exaggerated—a
common theme across COVID-19 narratives. The Plandemic story states that
death tolls were being exaggerated to “pave the way for a large-scale vaccination
program” (CON, 3). It argues that Big Pharma and the CDC are working in
tandem to sell “harmful” vaccines for profit. In order to do this, health authorities
at the CDC are giving Americans incorrect information; wearing a mask, for
example, is actually a way to activate the COVID-19 virus as opposed to being a
protective measure (BFN, 5). The Wuhan narrative pins the blame on China, a
longtime enemy of democracy in the US. Using reports that the Chinese
government tried to suppress COVID-19 news, the narrative suggests that China
is the real villain—unlike the Republican party, which has fought valiantly to get
the truth out (FXN, 1). This racially charged “Chinavirus” narrative redirects
COVID-19 frustrations away from the Trump administration’s botched
COVID-19 management (NYT, 5). The narrative distracts its audience from
mistakes made by “heroes” and weaponizes frustration into physical attacks on
the “enemy”.
Throughout the analysis, it became clear that all three narratives had been
influenced and recontextualized by the QAnon conspiracy. QAnon is a far-right
conspiracy that believes in a “deep state” run by Satan-worshipping cannibal
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liberals. It has existed in far-right digital social circles since 2016 when it first
broke through as part of the #Pizzagate conspiracy (CON, 1). The role of QAnon
in the circulation and construction of these narratives suggests that the narratives
are more common in far-right spaces. For example, one of the first places that
Plandemic broke was in a private QAnon group, posted with the caption,
“Exclusive Content, Must Watch” (NYT, 4). From here, users shared it to pages
for conservative politicians and their personal social circles. Both narratives
include the “deep state” motif. Plandemic’s suggestion that COVID-19 was
invented by health “elites” as a method of selling harmful vaccines is repurposed
to fit QAnon’s world domination narrative (CON, 3). Unrelated to the Plandemic
documentary, QAnon YouTuber Jordan Sather produced conspiracy videos
claiming COVID-19 was “planned” by virologists (BFN, 3). He based his claims
on a 2015 coronavirus vaccine patent, much like Plandemic II would later in the
year. Q supporters also influenced the 5G narrative, sharing threads on Twitter
about the health effects of electromagnetic radiation and how they’re
“suspiciously similar to exposure to 5G” (VOX, 3). According to QAnon, the
media is censoring the truth as a method of controlling the public. The older a
COVID-19 narrative got, the more it was woven into the larger QAnon story. The
narrative’s sprawling online presence helps share and shape the COVID-19 stories
into more aggressively anti-mainstream health and media authorities.
Though the COVID-19 narratives have many motifs in common, they all
included a number of inconsistencies in event sequences and causality. Each
narrative has a clear statement of truth or cause. Things fall apart when the
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narratives try to explain how the cause creates the effect (COVID-19). Early
claims about Wuhan indicated that COVID-19 was a bioweapon, created
intentionally as an attack on the US (BFN, 3). Later, rhetoric from Republican
politicians was adopted into the narrative to argue that COVID was covered up by
the Chinese government (TWP, 3). Some believed that COVID-19 wasn’t as
deadly as the WHO was making it seem, while others recognized its severity and
just wanted the “truth” about its origins to come out (FXN, 1). The Wuhan
narrative made guest appearances in the Plandemic conspiracy, as some versions
of the narrative argued that COVID-19 was a tool designed by Big Pharma and
constructed in Wuhan (CON, 2). Plandemic is riddled with inconsistencies. The
Judy Mikovits version of the story claims that everyone already has COVID-19
and that wearing a mask activates the virus. Plandemic II: Indoctrination goes on
to argue that either COVID-19 was a naturally occurring phenomenon that the
CDC put an illegal patent on, or it was a man-made virus being covered up by Big
Pharma and health officials (UST, 3). The diverging pathways indicate that the
Plandemic conspiracy has broken up into sub-narratives with different sequences
of events. Even the creator of the Plandemic documentary, which informs most of
the narrative’s components, stated that he did not understand what chain of events
led to COVID:

When Plandemic filmmaker Mikki Willis was asked if he really believed
COVID-19 was intentionally started for profit, his response was ‘I don’t
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know, to be clear, if it’s an intentional or naturally occurring situation. I
have no idea.’ (CON, 2)

Other Plandemic sub-narratives borrow ideas from QAnon and claim that
COVID-19 came from a “tainted batch of children’s blood that the world’s
celebrities drink to stay young” (BFN, 1). Still others argue that the virus was
made to sell vaccines equipped with tracking chips that will be activated by 5G
radiation (CON, 1). This is just one of the many things that the 5G narrative
claims it can do. Radiation pneumonia is one side-effect, which could explain
symptoms of COVID-19 in the respiratory system (YTB, 1). 5G is also capable of
weakening the body’s immune system, as well as transmitting COVID-19 directly
(CON, 1). And at the same time, COVID-19 is a hoax created to keep the public
at home during the installation of 5G towers worldwide. The main 5G narrative
argues that a lack of research on 5G means that any of these claims could be the
truth; that same lack of research, however, is what prevents the narratives from
proving their cause/effect relationship.

Establishing and contesting epistemic authority
COVID-19 conspiracy narratives use a mix of methods to establish
epistemic authority and challenge the information being provided by mainstream
media sources. To be considered knowledge, the information requires trustworthy
evidence; because conspiracies often lack solid evidence to support their
narratives, the stories rely on motifs that establish reliability and professionalism.
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The conspiracies often lack peer-reviewed evidence to support their claims of
cause and effect. In order to combat this “misinformed” narrative, conspiracies
utilize a mix of “professional” media content and reliable expert opinions to
establish their claims. They can also garner support and authority status by
exploiting mainstream media attacks on their figureheads. This combination
allows them to gain sympathy from the public, while also appearing as reliable as
mainstream forms of knowledge production.
The lack of “evidence” is the primary epistemic flaw found in most
conspiracy narratives. Characters in the narrative cite “enormous evidence” that
supports their arguments, but often cannot present said evidence out of fear of
retaliation from a higher power (CNN, 3). Eye-witness testimonies are few and far
between, and often just speculation. In the Vox interview with 5G conspiracists,
one anonymous woman based her knowledge on pure coincidence:

“When I was in Florence, I began to feel very ill. There are five new 5g
towers–they dug up the streets and laid the fiber optics while everyone
was, you know, at home muted. I was surprised they didn’t put blindfolds
on.” (YTB, 1).

Reports that rely on speculative evidence are challenged by mainstream health
and science authorities. For example, when pushed by conservative politicians to
investigate Wuhan, US intelligence officials challenged their lack of evidence
with the testimonies of external scientists who stated “the chances of a lab
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accident are very small” (NPR, 1). Though the Wuhan whistleblower achieved a
platform through Fox News, her claims were contradicted by an unrelated report
from a different Wuhan virologist:

We also have the word of one of the top virologists at the Wuhan lab,
documented in news articles, that she too wondered if the virus could have
originated in her lab and then took steps to verify it didn’t match any of
the viruses they had in culture. (VOX, 2).

In this case, the virologist acknowledged the narrative and took steps to ensure it
wasn’t true. Other scientists point to an established body of research to challenge
the narratives; documents covering the 5G narrative cite epidemiologists who’ve
found no record of a virus traveling over radio waves (TWP, 6). However,
conspiracies have adapted to integrate the contradictory literature as cover-up
propaganda. This literature and the lack of evidence only convince
non-conspiracists that the narratives are untrue. The narratives present the proof
as secret, secure information that they can’t disclose to the higher powers.
Paradoxically, the “truth” of the narrative must be shared with the public,
somehow revealing this secret evidence to the world (YTB, 3). In order to
convince others of their “truth”, COVID-19 conspiracies have adapted motifs
from mainstream knowledge production.
Conspiracy narratives are packaged in high-quality media to appear
professional and reliable. This includes physical publications, videos, and
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websites, as well as the occasional appearance on a local news network. The
Plandemic narrative demonstrates how high-quality editing and cinematography
create a façade of mainstream-level credibility (UST, 5). It and its sequel both
feature dramatic shots of key “experts” and narration detailing the expert’s
accomplishments (UST, 3). The color grading dulls the shots, leaving the footage
bland and gray. Audiences are likewise exposed to the dark truth of the
COVID-19 pandemic. In Plandemic II: Indoctrination, a clip of Dr. Fauci is
overlaid with a rapid montage of people mindlessly scrolling through their phones
and laptops; the narrator explains that the media they’re consuming is designed to
plant “evidence” that promotes the CDC’s false pandemic narrative. The audience
is cued to recognize the connection between public health guidance and the
“official” media narrative pushed by mainstream outlets. But Plandemic’s media
content isn’t just limited to the film and its sequel. Judy Mikovits’s 2014 book is
peddled as a “tell-all” about the evils of the NIH (BFN, 5). The pulled Sinclair
interview with Mikovits featured an on-screen graphic reading, “Did Dr. Fauci
create COVID-19?” (VOX, 1). The local news feature could’ve elevated Mikovits
to being a household name had it been aired, giving her a platform in at least 36
states and Washington D.C. This banned interview joins another banned broadcast
from California, where a doctor made similar claims about the government
exaggerating the virus’s severity (FXN, 6). Conspiracy coverage on Fox News has
also operated as a method of verifying the reliability of a narrative; all reports on
the Wuhan narrative are treated as credible news, even without proper evidence to
support their statements (FXN, 4; FXN, 9). Elevating the claims to a mainstream
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level gives Wuhan conspiracists a level of epistemic authority that other narratives
don’t have. However, this contradicts the notion that all mainstream media is out
to challenge conspiracies. Either an exception is made when the outlet agrees with
the narrative, or Fox News, which has platformed both the Wuhan narrative and
some parts of the Plandemic narrative, is one of the only exceptions.
Conspiracy narratives gain epistemic credibility when they’re promoted
by influential figures in society. As characters within the narrative, they normalize
the discussion of misinformation in mainstream spaces. Depending on their
occupation and role in the public, they can have varying impacts on the story’s
credibility. Celebrities like John Cusack and Woody Harrelson, who are known
for their acting careers and not careers in public health, were regarded with
scrutiny from many fans when they promoted the 5G narrative on Instagram and
Twitter (BFN, 2; FXN, 8). Though most audiences doubted these claims, media
coverage indicated that searches for ‘5G and COVID’ increased after celebrities
tweeted about it. Celebrity doctors received more credit from the public; figures
like Dr. Christiane Northrup, who’d made guest appearances on Oprah, and Dr.
Nicole Saphier, a Fox News medical contributor, promoted “several theories”
about COVID-19’s origins (NYT, 4; VOX, 1). Dr. Northup endorsed Plandemic
to her Facebook following, giving it credibility from a ‘recognizable’ health
expert. Dr. Saphier has a history of promoting accurate health information,
making her claims that COVID-19 could potentially be “man-made in a
laboratory” appear credible (VOX, 1).
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Because they’re already working in an institution centered around
knowledge production, members of the mainstream media have the same effect as
medical experts. For example, Tucker Carlson’s excessive claims that COVID-19
is not as severe as the government makes it seem were the topic of many Fox
News articles and videos. Carlson, who also provided the platform for the Wuhan
“whistleblower”, has argued that misinformation policies are “censorship” and
that “the virus just isn’t nearly as deadly as we thought” (FXN, 7; FXN, 5). Fox
News’s multi-platform format allows Carlson to spread misinformation on
television, in online articles, and on social media. His comments were almost as
widespread as those made by prominent US politicians, who are awarded the most
epistemic credit by the public as they are “national leaders”. Donald Trump used
Twitter to promote the Wuhan lab narrative and push back against the CDC and
health authorities (NPR, 1). Likewise, former C.I.A chief Mike Pompeo went onto
the ABC program This Week to discuss the “enormous evidence” he’d seen about
COVID-19 coming from a Wuhan lab (NYT, 6). The guise of dealing with foreign
policy gives politicians the credibility to assert conspiracy narratives are true. The
data indicates that politicians have more influence than health officials and
journalists, pointing to a shift in how social epistemology recognizes authorities.
Verified evidence, it seems, no longer matters as much as charisma and
personality.
Perhaps the most dangerous technique used by conspiracies to assert
epistemic authority is the ability to exploit negative media coverage and turn it
into a victimization narrative. Mainstream media coverage often targets the
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intelligence and credibility of conspiracists. Conspiracists “have no idea what
they’re talking about” (BFN, 3). Their narratives are referred to as “fringe
theories” and “unfounded” (TWP, 3; CNN, 2). When arguing that the narrative
lacks evidence or reason, the educational background of a conspiracist is taken
into consideration:

I included the educational background of these vocal conspiratorialists
because no legitimate physician, researcher, engineer or scientist has
found any evidence whatsoever that 5G causes, helps spread, or that
exposure to 5G signals mimics COVID-19 symptoms. (FXN, 8).

These comments, though meant to reduce the validity of the conspiracies, are
twisted into victimization narratives. The negative depiction of narrative “experts”
makes them look like the victims of the evil, mainstream-media deep state (CON,
2). Plandemic supporters champion Judy Mikovits because she’s been a victim of
the CDC’s censorship attempts; according to Mikovits herself, her “only crime”
was asking too many questions (YTB, 3). When her research was removed from a
peer-reviewed journal, conspiracists interpreted it as “silencing the truth” (UST,
5). Similarly, social media misinformation policies are attempts at censoring the
truth and force conspiracists to find their own safe spaces where they won’t be
persecuted (TWP, 4). These policies are attacks on free speech and should
“concern all journalists” who want to be able to speak their minds (FXN, 5).
Finally, the persecution is used as an excuse for why conspiracists aren’t able to
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provide concrete evidence of their claims. Because publishing life-changing
information could lead to a threat on their life, experts have to lay low and
therefore can’t give away too much to the general public (FXN, 4). When their
experts are being persecuted for their knowledge, conspiracists are more
sympathetic to the cause and wary of the dangerous deep state hunting them. This
pathos appeal is one of the strongest tactics used to obtain knowledge production
credibility. If conspiracy information wasn’t so earth-shattering, why would
mainstream media do everything it could to discredit it?
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6. Understanding COVID-19 Conspiracies in Digital Space
COVID-19 narratives exist in an epistemological limbo; for some, they are
fictional stories built with repeated motifs and ideas, while for others, they are
true facts, established by both old and new knowledge generation techniques.
Either way, conspiracies are still what Russian formalists considered “narratives”.
When broken down, the COVID-19 conspiracies contain the same motifs and
ideas (Louchart & Aylett, 2004). They can only be considered “truth” if they are
established with knowledge acquisition techniques. Historically, conspiracies like
the German Corpse Factory have utilized journalistic epistemology techniques to
establish themselves as “truths” (Van Heekeren, 2019). The COVID-19
conspiracies do this as well, while also utilizing newer techniques that rely on
emotional appeal to convince audiences of their arguments. This shift poses a
threat to traditional establishments of knowledge production. No longer do
epistemic authorities need to actually show evidence, prove their claims, or have
prior experience in knowledge production. Institutions of knowledge productions
cannot rely on their traditional techniques of “debunking” narratives, either, as the
conspiracies have started to adopt mainstream rejection into their stories as a
“threat to the truth”.
The reproduction and circulation of these conspiracy narratives have
played out almost exclusively in digital media spaces. What makes them notable
is their ability to adapt to circulation obstacles and turning those challenges into a
part of the narrative. COVID-19 misinformation stories have a distinct
distribution arc that exists in three stages: the pre-policy phase, the circulation
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phase, and the post-policy phase. Understanding this dynamic process can provide
insight for combatting conspiracies without pushing them into more selective and
harder-to-reach spaces.

Roots of Conspiracies
Each conspiracy is a repackaged assortment of motifs and “truths” from
past misinformation stories. The “causes” are taken from older narratives and
altered to fit the “effect”, the COVID-19 pandemic. The 5G-COVID narrative is
an off-shoot of the 5G conspiracy, which itself is a deviation from a larger,
technophobic discourse. The first anti-technology knowledge narrative was
published in 1978 by investigative journalist Paul Brodeur, who cited ambiguous
evidence that radiation frequencies were harmful. His article resurfaced in 2000
when physicist Bill Curry claimed in a presentation for Broward County Schools
in Florida that wireless technology was a serious health hazard. Anti-technology
conspiracists cited Curry’s claims during the SARS and H1N1 pandemics,
blaming SARS on 3G technology and H1N1 on 4G networks. In 2019, the
technophobic discourse resurfaced after the announcement of 5G technology. By
pure coincidence, 5G cellular towers were constructed in Wuhan just a few
months before the pandemic began. Connecting 5G to COVID-19 was an easy
conclusion for the scared technophobes who wanted to explain the then-unknown
virus. These anti-technology narratives take advantage of the public’s general lack
of scientific knowledge to connect “radiation”, a scary term for the ill-informed,
to actual, real-life physical harms.
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They mostly circulate in anti-technology social groups, such as New Age “health”
practitioners and far-right conspiracists. The 5G-COVID connection allows New
Age practitioners to make a profit, as the sub-narratives present various
COVID-19 cures that are designed to “prevent 5G radiation”. The
solutions—which don’t actually work—prey on the uninformed who are afraid of
radiation and don’t have experience in the telecommunications industry.
The Wuhan Lab conspiracy relies heavily on xenophobia and nationalistic
rhetoric, a core element of past pandemic discourses. It’s a direct reproduction of
how the SARS outbreak was attributed to Chinese immigrants, a discourse that
resulted in an increase in anti-Asian hate crimes (Person et al., 2004). A more
recent example of xenophobic misinformation is the linkage between Ebola and
West African cultures; this outbreak narrative reinforced the idea that Africa is
dirty and impoverished using harmful “othering” language (Millear, 2015). The
Wuhan Lab story pins COVID on the Chinese government with racially targeted
phrases like “Chinavirus” and “China disease”. This viscerally racist discourse
has physical and psychological effects on the real world, including an increase in
trauma and stress for Asian individuals, violent anti-Asian hate crimes, and the
promotion of China as a dirty, backward country (Misra et al., 2020). This
narrative uses discourses from medical populism, foraging a division between the
United States and China (Lasco, 2020). Pinning the virus on another culture
redirects the frustrations Americans might have about their own government.
Additionally, the story replicates the “bioweapon” narrative, as it suggested that
the virus was either intentionally created as a weapon, or that it was an accident
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but used as an attack on the rest of the world. This motif comes from past
pandemic narratives and fictional outbreak media. Shawn Smallman’s research on
Zika, for example, highlighted the belief that the virus was intentionally released
in Brazil as either a genetically modified bioweapon, or a New World Order
attack on marginalized women (Smallman, 2018). Some famous pandemic
movies, such as the inaccurate Outbreak, present the “bioterrorism” angle as the
cause for a disease. This motif is so common that, during the first few months of
the pandemic, virologists performed extensive research to ensure that COVID-19
was not intentionally created in a lab.
The Plandemic narrative has a complicated history and weaves
anti-vaccination discourses with ancient conspiracy themes. Though it’s
technically the newest of the three—Plandemic was released in May of 2020—the
story mixes plot points from anti-vaccination narratives with the deep state
concept. “Plandemic” itself is an umbrella title referring to the Plandemic
documentary and the larger, anti-CDC narrative that argues COVID-19 is a hoax.
The documentary surrounds Dr. Judy Mikovits’s research and role within the
anti-vax community. Anti-vaccination arguments themselves can be traced back
to the polio vaccine, when an unlucky batch led to a mass-infection of children.
Anti-polio vaccine groups capitalized on this instance and began to argue against
vaccines well before Andrew Wakefield published his paper on MMR and autism.
Wakefield’s story parallels Dr. Mikovits’; his MMR research was deemed
“invalid” and Wakefield was gracefully ejected from the scientific community.
This victimization turned him into an anti-vaccination martyr who was silenced
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before he could get the truth out. Like Wakefield, it was Dr. Mikovits’s
banishment from the scientific community that made her popular amongst
anti-vaxxers. She cites her personal experiences with Dr. Fauci and the CDC as
evidence that she’s telling the truth—though, according to one of the documents
in my analysis, these encounters didn’t actually happen. The second Plandemic
storyline builds on Mikovits’s claims about the CDC and other past conspiracies
about “Big Pharma”. This narrative was expanded upon in Plandemic II:
Indoctrination. It argues that the deep state is profiting off of vaccine production.
This story surfaces at least once every pandemic. Both Zika and H1N1 were at
one point blamed on Bill Gates, due to his involvement in public health promotion
(Smallman, 2015; Smallman, 2018). The media-CDC-Big Pharma deep state has
discursive roots in anti-Semitic ideology, which links Plandemic back to QAnon,
creating an imbalance of left-wing and right-wing audiences. The QAnon motif
appeals to the far right, while concerns about vaccine hesitancy attracts pockets of
left-wing New Age groups.
The components of COVID-19 conspiracies are mere recreations of past
healthcare misinformation stories. They use complex scientific concepts to scare
vulnerable populations and weaponize “othering” tactics to provide a villain
responsible for the virus. The cause/effect relationship of each narrative changes
slightly to fit the current pandemic. Finally, the narratives borrow discourses from
medical populism to make polarizing claims about the healthcare crisis. In
summary, the conspiracy narratives alone are not remarkable. What distinguishes
them from past pandemic discourses is how the narratives interact with external
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characters—such as the media and digital spaces—to expand upon and justify
their epistemic claims.

Narrative reproduction in the media
The interaction between mainstream media and conspiracies has two key
effects on narrative circulation and credibility. Understanding how these themes
arose and affect the narratives can help guide future recommendations for
misinformation prevention. The first effect addresses mainstream justification of
conspiracies, which provides the narratives with epistemic approval from
established knowledge authorities. The second is the increased circulation, which
is particularly harmful in areas with limited access to accurate news information.
Affirming mainstream coverage of conspiracy presents two issues for
public health: it provides credibility to an otherwise not credible story, and it
circulates the misinformation through spaces that might not have encountered it
otherwise. Journalists are established information authorities, whose jobs are to
provide accurate and credible information (Ekström & Westlund, 2017). They are
trained in discerning truth from fiction. Though the fragmentation of mainstream
media has led to higher levels of scrutiny, journalists are generally recognized as
truth-tellers by the American public. Audiences might reject news institutions that
don’t present information that aligns with their perceived political stance, but they
will still rely on the outlets that regularly confirm their beliefs (Mancini, 2013, p.
49). Therefore, news spaces that present conspiracies as truths are granting the
misinformation the same credibility as knowledge that is factually correct. If I am
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a regular Sean Hannity viewer, and he says that the virus is being blown out of
proportion, I might believe him over a CNN report that says otherwise (Bursztyn
et al., 2020). The best example of this process is the Wuhan conspiracy, which
was heavily promoted by Fox News. Fox produces a wide range of content that
includes both digital articles and television media. The data for this thesis
includes transcripts and articles from Fox that assert with 100% confidence that
COVID-19 was created in the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Viewers who trust Fox
as a news source are led to believe that this is the factual origin of the virus.
Airing conspiracies as accurate information leads to increased narrative
circulation, the second problem with mainstream coverage. Even if an outlet isn’t
giving the conspiracy total validation, covering it can still expose unaware
audiences to conspiratorial thought. Fox News’s coverage of Wuhan and the
Sinclair Broadcasting controversy are evidence of this problem. Sinclair owns
local access stations across the country. Had the interview with Dr. Mikovits been
aired, the company would be responsible for exposing millions of people to
Plandemic without providing any actual counterarguments. Viewers who take the
journalists at their word will share the interview with friends, continuing the
circulation cycle. In the case of Fox News, past reports have already indicated that
Fox viewers are less likely to adhere to protective guidelines and will encourage
others to break quarantine protocol on account of the virus being a hoax (Bursztyn
et al., 2020, p. 28). Increased misinformation circulation on local access networks
creates a knowledge disparity, providing those who rely on television news with
conspiracy-based information. The larger effects of this could include the growing

69
stereotype that rural and conservative populations are uneducated, as well as
real-world ramifications for those who do not adhere to healthcare policies
because their news sources told them not to.
Mainstream coverage of conspiracies does more harm than good, as it
serves as an epistemic justification for misinformation, as well as increases
circulation in areas with little news access. However, not all media coverage is
entirely positive; the effects of negative conspiracy coverage will be covered in
the next section, as they’re associated with the victim motif utilized by narratives
to garner emotional support.

Establishing epistemic authority
While conspiracy narratives use a mix of methods to assert epistemic
authority, the two most important strategies are either derived from mainstream
journalism or a result of media coverage. Eye-witness and expert testimonies are a
primary method of asserting knowledge authority and can make up for the lack of
physical evidence (Godler et al., 2020). The testimonies sometimes fall into the
victimization strategy, which implores audiences to believe a narrative because
it’s being silenced by the powerful elite.
In news media spaces, the eye-witness testimony is a primary method of
establishing that an event occurred and should be believed. Conspiracies, as a sort
of information narrative, use testimonies from “witnesses” and experts to assert
their knowledge claims. These testimonies are vital in digital space because they
provide human confirmation that a narrative is true, even in environments where
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images and videos can be doctored (Thomson et al., 2020). The Plandemic and
Wuhan narratives utilized expert testimonies as evidence of their claims, while the
5G narrative included eye-witness statements based on coincidence or
speculation. Plandemic relied on disgraced medical experts to relay its message,
while the Wuhan narrative relied on claims from security officials who were
“looking into the possibility” of the virus’s lab origins. The 5G-COVID
testimonies came from civilians—normal people—who’d noticed that 5G cell
towers were constructed right before the pandemic hit their area. They also
appeared online as celebrity endorsements from actors and musicians, who
encouraged their audiences to look into 5G’s harmful side-effects. These
testimonies don’t need evidence to be convincing; as news consumers, audiences
are trained to understand firsthand accounts as accurate statements because the
witnesses were “there when it happened” (Usher, 2020). Expert reports work the
same way, as they’re testimonies from someone with extensive experience in the
scientific field. By utilizing this established tactic in journalism, conspiracies can
trick audiences into believing they’re true—even if it’s only for a short period of
time.
A secondary and related technique is the employment of a victim motif.
Within conspiracies, many experts or witnesses are granted that level of
credibility because they were being “silenced” by a higher power. Media coverage
of conspiracies is a large part of this motif, as some coverage makes a mockery of
the misinformation. Mainstream outlets use language such as “baseless”,
“factually incorrect”, and “filled with nonsense” to describe conspiracies. In turn,
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the conspiracies point to this discourse as an example of harassment. Anyone who
believes in a narrative is being attacked by the “media deep state” for their beliefs,
and therefore should not trust what the mainstream is telling them. Not only does
this turn average news consumers against actual knowledge institutions, but it also
discredits public health authorities who want to prevent negative health behaviors.
Victimization also indicates that the “authority” in question was correct about
their assumption and is being hunted for trying to expose the truth. Dr. Mikovits,
for example, is considered a healthcare authority because her “controversial”
paper was pulled for getting too close to the truth about vaccines. Her history as a
virologist suggests that she has the training to understand how vaccines work. A
Wuhan virologist interviewed by Tucker Carlson was being suppressed by the
Chinese government, and feared that she’d be killed if she exposed the truth of
COVID’s origins to the world. Though the victim motif may not work for
everyone, it presents a particular appeal to anyone who’s felt attacked by a
mainstream authority for having “unpopular” beliefs. The truth is out there. The
deep state controlling the country just doesn’t want you to figure it out.
These two methods of establishing epistemic credibility are products of
the relationship between misinformation and information. The meaning of a
narrative is understood as a product of its relationship with other stories and ideas;
this means that conspiracies can either take on the appearance of a knowledge
narrative by using traditional methods of credibility, or use negative coverage as a
plot obstacle. The latter strategy indicates that mainstream attempts at debunking
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conspiracies must change their methodology or risk continuing the victim
complex makes misinformation narratives attractive.

Digital infrastructures
The final component of COVID-19 narrative production and circulation
comes from its relationship with digital spaces and infrastructures, particularly
social media platforms. Each narrative spread through a distinct, three-stage
process. The first stage, titled “pre-policy” in this research, is where the narrative
adjusts to present infrastructures in digital space. The “circulation” phase follows
the narrative as it flows from private social media spaces to mainstream media
outlets. Finally, the “post-policy” phase occurs when the narrative adapts to
obstacles in circulation—namely misinformation policies—to create new
selective spaces.
The “pre-policy” phase took place early in the pandemic, before social
networks established misinformation policies to try and combat conspiracy
sharing. During this phase, the conspiracies were still developing their plots and
events, and utilized flaws in social media algorithms to reach new audiences.
Prior literature identifies Twitter and Facebook as prime spaces for
misinformation sharing. Facebook’s private groups allowed users to select who
and what they wanted to engage with, building digital echo chambers for
conspiracy groups (Seymour, 2015). Twitter’s rapid, publicly accessible posting
format lacked a fact-checking process, allowing for widespread misinformation
sharing (Forati & Ghose, 2020; Bridgman et al., 2020). Both of these
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platforms—as well as the video-sharing site YouTube—had algorithms that
suggested “news” based on previous searches and clicks. The AI is operating on
the same basis as selective exposure theory: it learns to circulate misinformation
content to users who fit conspiracy demographics, or individuals who clicked on a
misinformation article anyway would then get suggested similar content (Iyngar,
2009). In the media, selective exposure means that some outlets target their
content towards established demographics. Fox News anchors promoting the
Wuhan narrative to Republicans is a relevant example, as most politicians who
supported Wuhan were conservative. The results of this research indicate that
selective exposure theory applies to digital algorithms as well, and plays a main
role in early misinformation circulation.
The narrative circulation phase occurred in three steps. First, the narrative
would need alternative media content, like YouTube videos or blog posts,
explaining how the story worked. These pieces would be shared by individual
users, as well as AI trained to circulate content to users it predicts are part of the
conspiracy network. This process also included bot accounts that were
programmed to rapidly produce and circulate misinformation ideas online.
Conspiracy media had titles such as “Exclusive content” and “Watch this NOW”,
which signaled to the audience that the information enclosed was important and
time-sensitive. This led to the second step, where consumers who believed the
media shared it across groups and platforms. Thanks to the ease of screenshotting
and sharing technologies, one person could disperse a narrative across multiple
spaces. Eventually, there would be a “turn” towards the mainstream. This turn
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could be a celebrity endorsement or an event that cites the narrative as inspiration.
All three narratives circulated in this fashion, with the distribution of the first
Plandemic documentary being the best example. The day it was released, it was
shared to a QAnon Facebook group, and from there shared to several far-right
pages. It trickled down from more extreme conspiracy groups to neutral
conservative circles that were already frustrated with COVID-19 lockdowns and
protocols. The “turn” came three days after its release, when multiple social
media spaces made headlines for removing it from their platforms. Individuals
who hadn’t heard of Plandemic could go look it up—by that point, it was moved
to an external website—and expose themselves to the story. It needs to be noted
that mass-removal did not stop the circulation of Plandemic. Its shift to selective
spaces online is representative of the third narrative stage, defined here as
“post-policy”.
The post-policy stage occurs after the narrative’s initial circulation, when
most platforms have implemented new rules or policies in an attempt to remove
the story. COVID-19 conspiracies are the first modern misinformation narratives
to induce such a widespread policy reform. Website employees acted as
authorities on what was and wasn’t accurate information; their algorithms were
then coded to detect and suppress conspiracy narratives based on their
conceptions of misinformation. The new misinformation policies inhibit
conspiracies from circulating in specific spaces, forcing the narratives to move to
new platforms. This has led to new selective spaces online. Though Plandemic
was removed from major streaming sites, conspiracists built their own websites to
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host the documentary and its sequel. The Stop 5G UK website provides resources
and networking options for 5G conspiracists. Like a Facebook group, the
webpage’s administrative actors have the ability to display whatever content they
want. But unlike the social media sites, Stop 5G UK is not bound by an external
actor that can monitor information for “truth”. This result of the post-policy phase
indicates that conspiracy narratives can lead to the construction of new selective
digital spaces. Conspiracy consumers will migrate away from mainstream sites to
discuss the stories in selective spaces, further polarizing the relationship between
“alternative” news and mainstream journalism.
COVID-19 conspiracies thrive in digital spaces, even those that try to limit
the spread of misinformation through algorithms and policies. Attempts at
stopping the narratives from circulating were met with a quick shift to new
platforms, allowing conspiracists to participate in misinformation echo chambers.
This should be a reason for concern. If the stories are able to adapt to and move
around obstacles, how can they be effectively silenced? Is “silencing” a narrative
the best way to go about removing it from pandemic discourses? The results of
this research indicate that the traditional methods of discrediting conspiracies are
no longer usable. However, conspiracies and misinformation still present a danger
to public health and should not be left to circulate online. Media authorities and
digital infrastructures alike need to shift their strategies or let the narratives
continue to cause havoc, online and in the real world.
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7. Conclusion
As the COVID-19 pandemic enters its second year, conspiracy narratives
continue to run rampant. The increased acceptance of misinformation presents a
troubling obstacle for vaccine distribution and herd immunity, as well as a
physical threat to marginalized groups that are incorrectly identified as the cause
of the virus. Visible effects of believing these narratives have already started to
unfold; 2020 had the most recorded anti-Asian hate crimes in the last twenty years
and increased the psychological stress for Asian families across the country.
Every new vaccine is met with doubts about its safety and concerns about being
“rushed” to meet a quota. Even the 5G narrative, which some media outlets
painted as comedically stupid, has resulted in arson and property damage around
the world. What is most concerning is the co-circulation of conspiracy narratives
and medical populist language. Othering rhetoric, simplification of complex
problems, and presentation of non-medical authorities as pandemic experts are all
motifs pushed by Trump and Bolsonaro during their catastrophic attempts at
COVID-19 management. Accepting and reproducing conspiracies as truth means
accepting the medical populist ideas that have led to low social distancing
compliance and high mortality rates.
When I return to the question initially posed in my introduction, I am torn.
At first glance, it is easy to blame all of this on QAnon or conservative
mouthpieces like Tucker Carlson for the spread of misinformation. However, a
deeper look into the big “how’s”—how we got here, how people buy into
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conspiracies, and how to move on—requires an inward look at the larger spaces
and media structures in place.
COVID-19 conspiracies are versatile and enduring narratives that turn
obstacles to circulation into events within their story. They form out of fear and
confusion as simple answers to complex—and, quite frankly,
horrifying—questions. Conspiracies take advantage of everyday people who don’t
understand complex radiation science, who already have limited news resources,
and provide them with a simple yet dangerous threat to direct their fear towards.
In digital space, it is much easier for some to share an Alex Jones video or
Plandemic than an epidemiological study. When the structures in place penalize
sharing misinformation, those who believe in a narrative will simply move to a
space where they feel like they have free speech. This amplifies the effects of
media fragmentation, as conspiracists will start seeking out niche outlets that
exclusively publish conspiratorial rhetoric. The treatment of conspiracies in most
mainstream media only aids this isolation, as outlets address misinformation
stories as ridiculous, uneducated jokes. Conspiracists pushed farther into the
fringe of the internet, and closer to committing dangerous acts.
This is not to say we need to feel bad for people who dump vaccines out of
fear of “5G trackers”, or those who physically harm others out of discrimination
and rage. Rather, these conclusions indicate that we need to re-evaluate our
methods of dispelling misinformation. Conspiracy narratives are taking on a life
of their own; they’re smarter—or smart enough to get around traditional
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obstacles. Digital spaces, both social media and news media, need to become
smarter too.
Moving forward, it’s also necessary for geographers to continue
investigating the digital as a geographic space. Digital spaces are environments
that mediate communication and information sharing. They change social
interactions by providing denizens of the digital with rapid, international spaces.
This research, however, indicates that the digital is not just a geographic
environment. Actors like AI and GIS software, which are part of the digital,
directly impact knowledge communication and production. The digital is a
conduit of communication, as well as a producer. Based on the role digital spaces
played in spreading COVID-19 misinformation, as well as the international reach
the digital has, it is necessary to recognize the digital as both a space and a
geographic actor in future geographic literature.
The focus on epistemic appeals and narrative motifs provides answers to
my primary research questions but does not provide concrete guidance for
conspiracy prevention. The scope of this thesis was limited by the emphasis on
the three unique theories and not COVID-19 misinformation at large. Due to the
specific focus, a larger pool of sources was used for a clearer understanding of
conspiracy discourses. The number of sources took precedent over quality,
leading to some documents providing more reliable information than others.
Limiting the sources and increasing the documents from each source would
streamline the discursive themes present, making them more consistent and
reliable. Additionally, though this thesis alludes to some demographics being
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more vulnerable to conspiracies than others, it cannot come to any distinct
conclusions about the social makeup of conspiracy networks. Most documents
included a left-leaning bias and portrayed any left-wing conspiracist as amicable,
while vilifying right-wing conspiracy believers. To account for this issue, future
research could identify more neutral sources, or involve qualitative interviews
with conspiracists themselves.
This and other studies on conspiracies within social media focus on
Facebook and Twitter as common sites for misinformation circulation, where the
majority of the “pre-policy” narrative construction took place. To provide a more
comprehensive understanding of how conspiracies changed after the introduction
of misinformation policies, future research could study the role of selective
spaces, third-party hosting sites, and less-regulated social media platforms in
misinformation circulation. Additionally, future research on prevention strategies
should take a qualitative approach, working with former conspiracists to
understand what or how changed their understanding of conspiracy narratives.
Just as identifying motifs within conspiracy narratives helps us understand why
people believe misinformation, isolating the events that ended a narrative can
provide solutions for permanently dispelling harmful conspiracies.
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Appendix 1: Glossary of Key Terms
Conspiracies: False information narratives that explain a political, social, or
economic event as the work of a secret or elite organization.
Digital Space: Space that is either made by, through, or of the digital. Specifically
refers to digital technology or media.
Disinformation: False information that was intentionally circulated to disrupt the
flow of accurate news.
Epistemology: The study of information and knowledge construction.
Mainstream Media: News sources that produce content in multiple media spaces.
Often regarded as epistemic authorities.
Mediated Space: Space that is either made by, through, or of the media.
Medical Populism: A branch of political thought that turns the public against the
dominant health establishment.
Misinformation: False information that is spread unintentionally or without the
actor knowing it’s untrue.
Motifs: Repeated regimes of truth, or ideologies and themes, that occur in
narratives.
Narrative: A cause-and-effect set of events that use repeated characters and
motifs to communicate an emotional truth.
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